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How	shifts	in	Scottish	public	opinion	helped	the
Conservatives	reverse	their	long-term	decline
Kieran	Wright	argues	that	changes	in	Scottish	public	opinion	since	the	introduction	of	devolution
have	neutralised	certain	features	of	the	Scottish	Conservative	Party	that	used	to	be	a	significant
electoral	liability.
In	marked	contrast	to	the	party’s	anaemic	performance	in	the	rest	of	Great	Britain,	the
Conservative	Party	in	Scotland	enjoyed	its	best	night	in	decades	in	the	2017	general	election.	It
won	more	Westminster	seats	than	it	had	done	since	1983,	and	won	its	largest	share	of	the	Scottish
vote	since	it	ousted	Labour	from	power	in	1979.	For	most	of	the	past	two	decades,	the	party	failed	to	win	more
than	a	single	Westminster	seat,	and	struggled	to	make	an	impact	at	Holyrood.
What	caused	this	dramatic	revival	in	the	party’s	fortunes	in	Scotland?	It	is	commonly	assumed	that	the	reasons
for	the	collapse	of	the	Conservatives	in	Scotland	that	culminated	in	the	party	ceasing	to	exist	at	parliamentary
level	at	the	1997	general	election	centred	around	a	rejection	of	Thatcherism	and	the	Poll	Tax	in	particular.	In
reality,	the	party’s	decline	began	long	before	the	ascent	of	Margaret	Thatcher.
In	1964,	the	Conservatives	began	to	contest	Scottish	elections	without	the	use	of	the	formal	“Unionist”	description
in	response	to	the	perceived	declining	relevance	of	taking	a	distinctively	unionist	stance.	The	Conservative’s
problem	was	that	conservatism	without	unionism	had	much	less	appeal;	a	problem	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that
the	brand	of	conservatism	it	was	putting	forward	moved	increasingly	towards	incorporating	a	form	of	economic
liberalism	that	had	limited	support	in	Scotland.	The	party	went	on	to	lose	seats	in	six	out	of	the	nine	Westminster
elections	that	took	place	after	1960,	culminating	in	the	wipeout	of	1997.	Its	decline	would	only	begin	to	reverse
when	its	unionism,	once	again,	became	a	relevant	distinguishing	feature	–	and	indeed,	an	asset.
Sometime	Labour	Secretary	of	State	for	Defence	George	Robertson	infamously	predicted	that	devolution	would
“kill	nationalism	stone	dead”.	In	fact,	devolution	was	ultimately	to	provide	the	catalyst	for	the	rise	of	Scottish
nationalism,	with	the	Scottish	National	Party	coming	to	power	in	the	Scottish	Parliament	and	support	for
independence	reaching	unprecedented	levels.	Paradoxically,	this	rise	of	nationalism	was	to	provide	an	opening
for	the	most	unionist	party	in	Scotland.
Figure	1:	Which	best	describes	you,	on	scale	from	‘Scottish	not	British’	to	‘British	not	Scottish’?
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The	above	chart	is	compiled	using	data	from	the	‘Moreno’	national	identity	question	in	the	regular	Scottish	Social
Attitudes	Survey.	It	asks	respondents	to	state	whether	they	feel	wholly	or	mainly	Scottish,	wholly	or	mainly	British
or	equally	Scottish	and	British.	It	shows	a	trend	away	from	respondents	citing	a	wholly	or	mainly	Scottish	identity
and	towards	more	people	saying	they	are	equally	Scottish	and	British	or	wholly	or	mainly	British.
The	trend	is	partially	reversed	in	the	most	recent	survey	conducted	in	2016	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Brexit
referendum.	It	remains	to	be	seen	whether	this	presages	a	new	trend,	or	is	one-off	reaction	to	the	surprise	Brexit
vote.	Whatever	is	the	case,	the	fact	remains	that	the	trend	since	devolution	is	towards	more	respondents	citing	a
British	aspect	to	their	identity	that	is	at	least	as	important	as	any	Scottish	component.
Devolution	has	clearly	provided	a	context	in	which	Scottish	nationalism	has	achieved	unprecedented	levels	of
support.	However,	while	a	significant	section	of	the	Scottish	electorate	are	clearly	attracted	to	nationalism,	a
significant	portion	also	seem	to	be	repelled	by	it.	The	rise	of	the	SNP	has	been	accompanied	by	a	rise	in	the
number	of	Scottish	voters	citing	Britishness	as	a	significant	aspect	of	their	identity.
For	the	Scottish	Conservatives,	this	is	hugely	significant.	It	creates	a	situation	in	which	the	perceived	Britishness
of	a	staunchly	unionist	party	is	no	longer	the	electoral	liability	it	was	back	at	the	turn	of	the	century	when	two-
thirds	of	the	Scottish	electorate	saw	themselves	as	predominantly	not	British.	Indeed,	it	proved	to	be	as	strong
point	when	appealing	for	the	votes	of	those	opposed	to	the	idea	of	a	second	referendum	on	Scottish
independence,	something	that	formed	the	cornerstone	of	the	party’s	2017	campaign	in	Scotland.
In	the	years	since	the	introduction	of	devolution,	the	Scottish	electorate	has	also	become	more	eurosceptic.	At
the	turn	of	the	century,	Scottish	Social	Attitudes	found	just	11%	of	Scottish	voters	wanting	to	see	their	country
leave	the	European	Union,	while	only	27%	wanted	to	see	the	EU’s	powers	reduced.	In	the	most	recent	survey,
25%	support	Brexit	(an	even	larger	38%	actually	voted	to	leave	the	EU	in	the	2016	referendum),	while	the
number	wanting	the	EU	to	have	fewer	powers	has	leapt	to	42%.	This	is	of	obvious	benefit	to	the	Scottish
Conservatives,	reducing	the	extent	to	which	their	euroscepticism	estranges	them	from	significant	sections	of	the
Scottish	electorate,	and	addressing	the	more	general	impression	that	their	vision	of	the	kind	of	country	Scotland
should	be	is	widely	different	to	that	shared	by	most	Scottish	voters.
Of	course,	there	are	other	factors	contributing	to	the	much	improved	performance	by	the	Scottish	Conservatives
in	2017.	Their	leader,	Ruth	Davidson,	is	undoubtedly	an	electoral	asset.	In	every	Yougov	survey	on	the	Scottish
party	leaders	conducted	this	year	Davidson	has	enjoyed	a	better	net	favourability	rating	than	First	Minister	Nicola
Sturgeon.	But	it	is	unlikely	that	the	party	could	have	reaped	the	full	benefits	of	having	a	widely	respected	leader
had	there	not	also	been	shifts	in	Scottish	public	opinion	that	make	in	particular	the	party’s	British	Unionism,	but
also	its	euroscepticism,	much	less	electorally	toxic	than	used	to	be	the	case.
_____
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